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ABSTRACT A key feature of the rise of neoliberal politics and policy has been the
progressive shift of risk from corporations and national states to the local government,
individuals and households. In this article, we argue that, in the UK, ‘great risk shift’ has
not only been intensiﬁed by recession and austerity but has also been marked by the
unevenness of the redistribution of risk and insecurity across scales and places, and
between different types of household. In order to capture the differentiated nature of
experiences and impacts of recession, risk and insecurity, this article ﬁrst considers the
spatial and temporal dynamics of recession and the great risk shift. It then goes on to
localise and embed these dynamics within the city regions and local authorities of Bristol
and Liverpool, drawing on a quantitative survey of 1,013 households, across a range of
different household types. The survey was segmented geographically and by ten different
household types using Ipsos-MORI’s (ACORN) classiﬁcation of residential neighbour-
hoods. Whilst the evolving crisis and subsequent austerity measure have been a ‘moving
target’ for cities, the local government and households, the household survey was under-
taken in the two city regions in the winter of 2011 and explored experiences and impacts
since 2008. It will seek to demonstrate the nature, impact and ‘lived experience’ of the
‘risk shift’ during this period and consider the ongoing and broader implications for
households, and national and local policymakers.
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Introduction
A key feature of the rise of neoliberal politics and policy has been the progressive
shift of risk from corporations and national states to local governments, individuals
and households (Peck 2012; Kennett, Forrest, and Marsh 2012). In this article, we
argue that, in the UK, this so-called ‘great risk shift’ (Hacker 2008) has not only
been intensiﬁed by recession and austerity but has also been marked by the
unevenness of the redistribution of risk and insecurity across scales and places,
and between different types of households (Kennett et al. 2012). In order to capture
the differentiated nature of experiences and impacts of recession, risk and inse-
curity, this article ﬁrst considers the spatial and temporal dynamics of recession
and the great risk shift. It then goes on to localise and embed these dynamics: ﬁrst
within the cities of Bristol and Liverpool and then, drawing on a survey of 1,013
households, across different social groups within the two cities. In so doing, the
analysis attempts to demonstrate the unevenness of the impacts and responses to
recession and austerity and the ‘great risk shift’. The survey was segmented
geographically and by ten different household types using Ipsos-MORI’s
(ACORN) classiﬁcation of residential neighbourhoods. Whilst the evolving crisis
and subsequent austerity measure have been a ‘moving target’ for cities (URBACT
2010), the local government and households, the household survey was under-
taken in the two city regions in the winter of 2011 and explored experiences and
impacts since 2008. The ﬁndings will seek to demonstrate the nature, impact and
‘lived experience’ of the ‘risk shift’ during this period and consider the ongoing
and broader implications for households, and national and local policymakers.
Recession, austerity and the ‘great risk shift’
The economic meltdown in 2008 highlighted the instability and contradictions
inherent in an increasingly ﬁnancialised model of capitalism and that engagement
with globalisation means being subject to economic cycles. Economic restructur-
ing, world connectivity and integration into global ﬁnancial markets, whilst pre-
requisites for inclusion in one phase of globalisation, can also be the recipe for
economic downturn and vulnerability in another. The 2008 crisis was merely the
latest and most severe expression of the systemic tensions and contradictions in a
loosely regulated global system of ﬁnancialised capitalism (Meegan et al. 2014).
The causes of the global economic crisis have been extensively discussed
(Smith 2010; Mullard 2011; Gamble 2009; Turner 2008). There is an intimate
relationship between globalisation, ﬁnancialisation and urbanisation, and the role
of cities in highlighting the temporal, spatial and social dimensions of the crisis.
Cities have been identiﬁed as the ‘locus’ for the unfolding of the crisis (Harvey
2012; Aalbers 2012; Kennett et al. 2012), and where the transfer of risk and the
uneven geography of the impacts of and recovery from the downturn can be
highlighted (Hutton and Lee 2012). The ﬁnance led regime of accumulation has
been fed through urban restructuring, expansion and speculation with proﬁt
generated through the production, revitalisation and gentriﬁcation of the built
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environment in what Aalbers (2012) calls the property/ﬁnancial complex.
Neoliberal urban governance has sought to ‘entrepreneurialise’ cities, a process
that has been reinforced following the global economic crisis and subsequent era
of austerity. Cities and citizens are being resuscitated ‘as sites for capital accu-
mulation’ (Wilson 2004, 771), and ﬁnancialisation (Finlayson 2009).
Since its onset, the Great Recession of 2008 has evolved temporally and
spatially from a global ﬁnancial crisis to a sovereign debt crisis, with the opening
up of a policy space for the ‘socialisation of losses’ and an austerity agenda. Private
debt has been transferred to the public purse, and the government’s austerity
programme is being felt at the local level ‘as the price paid to rescue the ﬁnancial
system’ (Kennett, Forrest, and Marsh 2012, 13). This evolution has demonstrated
the ‘reduction of the distance between high ﬁnance and everyday life’ (Finlayson
2009, 402), as well as the recalibration of risk and responsibility, its devolution to
cities and households, and mediation through a reinvigorated neoliberal policy
agenda. In the UK, the politics of austerity have rewritten national and local
budgets, and have been used to justify the reconﬁguration of the relationship
between central and local governments, and between the state and the citizen.
From 2010, the risk shift was further embedded with a change in emphasis from
the global dimension of the crisis and a much stronger narrative and policy focus
on local government and households, particularly those in receipt of welfare
beneﬁts. At a time of increasing volatility in family income in England, the most
far reaching attempt to reform fundamentally an established welfare state was
underway (Taylor-Gooby 2012). The ‘cost of living crisis’ became a subject of
intense political debate (BBC 2011; Balls 2014), with concerns regarding the
rising costs of food, fuel and light (Gordon et al. 2013, 12; House of Commons
Energy and Climate Change Committee 2013) accompanied by consistently fall-
ing real wages between 2010 and 2014, the longest period since 1964 (Taylor,
Jowett, and Hardie 2014, 17). Whilst recent projections suggest that median
household incomes have returned to the pre-crisis levels (2007–2008) they remain
2% below what they were in 2009/2010 (Cribb, Hood, and Joyce 2015).
The public spending cuts targeted at virtually eliminating the annual ﬁscal
deﬁcit and reducing the national debt have to be seen as part of a broader
systemic restructuring of almost all public services and the welfare state in the
context of ‘the reallocation of risk from collective to individual and the delegi-
timisation of interventionism’ (Finlayson 2009, 403), an intensiﬁcation of the
‘great risk shift’ (Hacker 2008), and growing household economic insecurity.
Recession and austerity in the UK have accelerated this shift in risk as weak and
unstable labour markets, growing debt and a lack of savings (Centre for Social
Justice 2013; Collard and Davies 2012; Ofﬁce for Fair Trading 2013) adversely
impacting on household living standards and security.
The depth, breadth and nature of the ‘great risk shift’, as well as the impact of
the crisis and austerity and responses to them, are localised and translated
unevenly between and within cities, and across different household types
depending on the congruence of speciﬁc historical, political and policy legacies,
socio-economic proﬁles and risk factors. The remainder of this article will
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explore these dynamics as they coalesce in Bristol and Liverpool, and for
different social groups.
Bristol and Liverpool: pre-crisis contexts and trajectories
Both Bristol and Liverpool owe much of their early growth to their respective
ports during industrialisation, but they have followed rather different trajectories
over the past half century. Liverpool has arguably experienced a more proble-
matic process of adjustment to global economic change than Bristol. Its loss of
status as ‘Gateway to Empire’ and lynchpin of the old international division of
labour has had massive economic and social impact (Meegan 2003). Following
three decades of sustained economic and population decline the city, by the end
of the 1990s, was beginning to experience some revival, not least from the
synergistic and cumulative effect of some, if not all, of the panoply of policy
interventions it had been receiving from Europe and central governments (Davies
and Pill 2012). This revival has been accompanied by major physical regenera-
tion of the city centre, the creation of a visitor economy boosted by the city’s
year as the European capital of culture in 2008 (Parkinson 2008; Littleﬁeld
2009), alongside improved governance and local economic development activity
(Harding et al. 2004), in combination contributing to something of an ‘urban
renaissance’ in the city.
Economic diversity within the Bristol City Region was strengthened over the
boom years and it has consolidated its position as the archetypal post-industrial
city or ‘ideopolis’ in the South West of England (Jones et al. 2006; Work
Foundation 2006). Whist Bristol has beneﬁted from urban policy programmes
in the past, regeneration initiatives and property development partnerships have
tended to adopt a pro-business, pro-growth agenda (Davies and Pill 2012), given
that the city has traditionally been unsuccessful in attracting signiﬁcant govern-
ment urban assistance (Tallon 2007). However, the city region did beneﬁt from
the implicit policy of the dispersal of government defence-related activities in the
growth period, which, together with the large scale edge city development of the
northern fringe of the city, and the private sector decentralisation of banking and
insurance jobs from London added to its relatively strong local economic base
(Boddy et al. 2004; Tallon 2007). It has also been representative of the ‘spear-
head of a raft of increasingly connected English provincial cities’ (Taylor and
Aranya 2006), as world city network connectivity change saw large gains for
Bristol between 2000 and 2004 (Tallon 2007; Centre for Cities 2011). In terms of
the overall global connectivity and out of 17 UK cities, Bristol is sixth and
Liverpool is eleventh (Taylor et al. 2011). Bristol is clearly embedded into the
global economy and ﬁnancial sector in terms of a concentration of banking,
ﬁnance and insurance and in their share of employment in the top 20 exporting
sectors, which for Bristol is 33%. Whilst Liverpool’s trajectory is less well-
established and its share is 26% (Centre for Cities 2009).
Whilst economic growth has been evident in both Bristol and Liverpool city
regions, there are pockets of entrenched and concentrated disadvantage, which
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have remained stubbornly disconnected from growth, with marked differences
between them in terms of the depth and extent of deprivation and the number of
beneﬁt recipients. According to the 2010 indices of multiple deprivation (IMD) –
drawing on data that just predate the 2008 recession – the local authorities of
Bristol and Liverpool lie at the opposite end of the rankings, with Liverpool the
worst performing core city in terms of deprivation levels, and Bristol the least
deprived (IMD 2010). The Bristol city region as a whole emanates an aura of
‘afﬂuence’ masking enduring deprivation and disconnected communities, and in
spite of the proximity of wealthy and poorer neighbourhoods in the city region.
Localising and embedding crisis, austerity and risk
It can be argued, then, that the two cities entered the recession from different
positions, with Liverpool on the back of a relatively recent, but potentially fragile
economic renaissance and Bristol with a more diverse and buoyant local econ-
omy (Kennett et al. 2013). They also occupy different positions in the national
urban system and have quite distinct socio-economic and labour market proﬁles
which have been key factors in shaping the ways in which recession and
austerity have played out.
In the case of Liverpool, greater historical dependence on public sector
employment has resulted in an austerity-instigated loss of nearly 9,000 jobs,
mostly full-time, and at double the national rate (Table 1). This job loss has been
mirrored by some growth in private sector jobs but not by as much – some 8,000
jobs; and these jobs have been mainly part-time. Bristol has also lost public
sector jobs, on a par with the national rate and, like Liverpool, mainly in full-
time jobs. Private sector jobs have increased but, again like Liverpool, not
enough to match the public sector loss and are part-time. The average earnings
– adjusted for inﬂation – have also fallen for full-time workers in both cities
above the national rate, and notably so for the lowest paid (those in the bottom
20%). For part-time workers, the pattern is different. Real average part-time
earnings have remained relatively static in Liverpool but have fallen signiﬁcantly
in Bristol, well above the national rate at both ends of the earning range.
Between 2008 and 2013, the number of full-time employees fell faster than
nationally in both cities, and particularly Liverpool, with a rate over three times
the national. In Liverpool, the fall in full-time employment has been mirrored in
a marked growth in part-time employment, at nearly 6 times the national rate. In
Bristol, in contrast, part-time employment has also grown but at just below the
national rate. Unemployment increased signiﬁcantly in both, doubling in Bristol
(from 4.2 to 9%) and nearly doubling in Liverpool (from 6.8 to 12.7%).
The unemployment rate in Bristol has gone from being substantially below
national at the onset of recession to rise above it after 6 years of recession and
austerity. The unemployment rate in Liverpool has remained stubbornly above
the national, but with the gap widening. Youth unemployment rates, in particular,
have increased signiﬁcantly, again above the national average in both cities: by
just over 20% points in Liverpool and some 13% points in Bristol.
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Table 1. Labour market indicators of the impact of recession and austerity on Bristol and Liverpool
Recession and austerity
Jobs: employees/(employment) Change 2008–2013 % Change 2008–2013
Bristol-total −4,300 −1.8
Bristol-full time (FT) −5,100 −3.2
Bristol-part time (PT) 800 +1.0
Liverpool-total −4,400 −1.9
Liverpool-FT −11,100 −7.1
Liverpool-PT 6,600 +8.7
GB-total −255,800 −0.9
GB-FT −385,400 −2.1
GB-PT 129,500 1.5
Bristol
Change 2009–2013
(2008 n/a) % Change 2009–2013
Private sector 1,100 +1
FT −700 −0.6
PT 1,800 +3.2
(Employment) −300 −0.2
Public sector −4,200 −7.3
FT −5,000 −13.5
PT 800 +3.9
(Employment) −4,200 −7.3
Liverpool
Private sector 7,700 +4.8
FT 2,700 +2.6
PT 5,100 +8.8
(Employment) 7,400 +4.5
Public sector −9,100 −13.4
FT −8,700 −17.9
PT −500 −2.6
(Employment) −8,800 −12.9
Great Britain
Private sector 850,200 +4.1
FT 481,800 +3.3
PT 368,400 +5.8
(Employment) 757,300 +3.4
Public sector −316,300 −5.6
FT −199,500 −5.6
PT −116,700 −5.4
(Employment) −318,200 −5.6
Earnings: Annual gross pay – residents £2013
Bristol Change 2008–2013 % Change 2008–2013
FT-mean −3,133 −9.5
FT-20 %ile −1,651 −8.6
FT-80 %ile −3,177 −7.7
PT-mean −2,230 −17.0
PT-20 %ile −536 −10.7
PT-70 %ile −2,831 −18.5
(continued )
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Major welfare reforms and reductions in local government spending power have
had a substantial, although uneven, impact on places and households. Beatty and
Fothergill’s (2013) estimates of the total impact of the reduction of welfare spending
for the core cities up to 2014/2015 are shown in Figure 1. The losses in Liverpool
are one and a half times the national compared with those in Bristol that are just
above the national. The councils in both cities have set up schemes to assist
households affected by these changes. In Liverpool, some £3.2 million has been
put aside in the budget to halve the impact of the Government’s Council Tax beneﬁt
cuts that are estimated by the council to affect some 45,000 households (Liverpool
City Council 2014). In Bristol, a similar Welfare Reform Hardship Fund (£0.5
million) has been set up to help households hit hardest by national beneﬁt changes
including the politically controversial ‘Bedroom Tax’/‘removal of the spare room
subsidy’ impacting heavily on social housing tenants (Bristol City Council 2013).
Whilst cities with higher proportions of residents claiming beneﬁts will feel
the greatest effects from welfare retrenchment, in both Bristol and Liverpool
Table 1. (Continued).
Recession and austerity
Jobs: employees/(employment) Change 2008–2013 % Change 2008–2013
Liverpool
FT-mean −3,140 −10.0
FT-20 %ile −1,692 −9.4
FT-80 %ile −2,759 −7.0
PT-mean −36 −0.3
PT-20 %ile 22 +0.4
PT-70 %ile −864 −7.0
Great Britain
FT-mean −3,433 −9.3
FT-20 %ile −1,348 −7.0
FT-80 %ile −3,501 −7.8
PT-mean −799 −6.6
PT-20 %ile −328 −6.3
PT-70 %ile −891 −6.6
Unemployment
(% rates) aged
16–64
Relativity index
(GB = 100) 2008
[rate %]
Relativity index
(GB = 100): July 13-June
14 [rate %]
2008-July 13/June 14
percentage point
change in rate
Bristol 72 [4.2] 129 [9.0] [+4.8]
Liverpool 117 [6.8] 174 [12.7] [+5.9]
Great Britain 100 [5.8] 100 [7.7] [+1.2]
Aged 16–24
Bristol 70 [10.5] 124[23.1] [+12.6]
Liverpool 75 [11.4] 171 [31.8] [+20.4]
Great Britain 100 [15.1] 100 [18.6] [+3.5]
Sources & Notes: Jobs: Business Register and Employment Survey; all 2008 data have been rescaled;
Bristol and Liverpool data exclude farm agriculture (SIC subclass 01000). Earnings: Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings. Estimates for 2011 and subsequent years use a slightly differing weighting
scheme due to a change from SOC 2000 to SOC 2010 therefore care should be taken when making
comparisons with earlier years. Unemployment: Annual Population Survey. GB, Great Britain.
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there is clear evidence of a positive relationship between levels of deprivation
and reductions in local government spending power (Fitzgerald 2012). From
2010/2011 to 2014/2015, Liverpool, the most deprived city in the IMD, has
experienced the largest reduction in central government funding of all eight core
cities, whilst Bristol has had the smallest (Figure 2).
Liverpool City Council had to ﬁnd savings of £91 million in 2011/2012 – a
reduction of around 21%, with a further £50 million of savings to be found in
2012/2013, £21.6 million in 2013/2014, £39 million in 2014/2015, £28 million
in 2015/2016 and £17.6 million in 2016/2017 – a total of £247.5 million in
nominal terms over 6 years. The Council has calculated that its budget proposals
will signiﬁcantly affect services for older people, children, disabled people and
socio economically disadvantaged individuals and groups.
The impact on Bristol has not been quite as severe as it has been less reliant
on speciﬁc needs-based area grants from the central government. Indeed, it had
already lost its heighbourhood renewal fund grant in 2007, when it failed to
win its bid in the transition to the working neighbourhood fund. Davies and Pill
(2012, 2207) have argued that as time-limited central government revitalisation
funding was coming to an end ‘there were signs that political support for
neighbourhood governance was diminishing’ and was being replaced by geo-
political upscaling, the politics of self-help and market-led growth. Thus,
Bristol City Council had already begun a ‘retreat from …the more interven-
tionist and inclusive variants of neoliberal governance’ (Davies and Pill 2012,
2212), with reduced resources before the recession and government cuts were
announced. It nevertheless has still had to reduce its annual revenue spending
in nominal terms from £400 million in 2010–2011 to £330 million by
–149.4
–129.1 –128.7
–119.1
–104.3 –102.1
–100.2 –97.9
–160
–140
–120
–100
–80
–60
–40
–20
0
Local Authority GB
Figure 1. Estimated impact of welfare cuts to 2014/15 – ﬁnancial loss of beneﬁts per working age
adult, English core cities (£s per year: index GB = 100; £470)
Source: Based on ﬁgures in Beatty and Fothergill (2013)
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2014–2015, an overall cut of 18%. The £70 million cuts are being front-loaded:
£28 million 2011/2012; £21 million 2012/2013; £6 million 2013/2014 and £15
million 2014/2015.
Recession, the ‘Great Risk Shift’ and everyday lives
Whilst the previous section has highlighted the nature of the ‘great risk shift’ and
the uneven spatial dimensions of the impacts of and responses to recession and
austerity in Bristol and Liverpool, the focus will now turn to the impacts on
different kinds of households. Different social groups and household types have
been impacted in multiple ways with the dynamics constituting and embedding
crisis, austerity and risk in everyday life evolving over time. In the early phase of
the crisis (between 2008 and 2009/2010), it was primarily middle and upper
income groups who felt the labour market impact and accompanying falls in
income (Jenkins et al 2011; Brewer et al. 2013). Working age adults without
children were also more likely to have suffered greatest in terms of unemploy-
ment rates during this period (Howell, Leaker, and Barrett 2010). Whilst real
incomes fell across the distribution, it was those at the higher points in income
who experienced larger proportionate reductions. In contrast, the household
sector was relatively well protected during this recessionary period between
2007 and 2009 due to the levels of ‘social beneﬁts’ paid by the government
during this time, combined with the overall lower taxes on income and wealth
which helped to insulate households from the full force of the recession.
Despite the evidence that social beneﬁts and decreasing taxes served to
protect the incomes of many households up to 2009, since then UK households
–£329
–£284
–£227
–£218
–£211
–£198
–£130
–£117
–£214
–£350
–£300
–£250
–£200
–£150
–£100
–£50
Liverpool Manchester Birmingham Newcastle Nottingham Sheffield Leeds Bristol
Core Cities
Average
Figure 2. Cumulative reduction in revenue spending power 2010/11 to 2014/15, English core cities
(£s per person)
Source: Newcastle City Council (2013)
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have been increasingly exposed to the risk shift associated with the recession,
and austerity responses of national and local governments. Rationalisation in
the labour market and rising unemployment, particularly amongst those aged
16–24 (discussed earlier in this article), above inﬂation rises in essential house-
hold living costs, restricted access to borrowing, and static earnings have all
impacted on households. A series of tax and beneﬁt reforms which began in
2011 with Child and Work Tax Credit and Child Beneﬁt created challenges for
different kinds of households, particularly those with dependent children and on
lower incomes (Browne 2012). A number of local studies have demonstrated
the ways in which welfare reform has had an impact on poorer households (for
example see Vale 2009; ILG/ANEC 2013). In contrast, whilst retired house-
holds have not been left entirely unscathed by the recession, experiencing
reduction in income received from investments for example, between 2007/
2008 and 2011/2012 the medium income for retired households grew by 5.1%
whilst the median income for non-retired households fell by 6.4% (ONS 2013).
The research reported below draws out the perceptions and everyday life
experiences of households in recession captured in a survey that was conducted
across Bristol and Liverpool between mid-October and mid-December 2011.
1,013 households, 509 in Bristol and 503 in Liverpool, took part in the survey
the ﬁndings of which are discussed in the following sections of the article.
The survey: Bristol and Liverpool households in recession
In order to capture a diversity of household types and experiences, the household
survey sample was drawn utilising the geodemographic ‘Classiﬁcation of
Residential Neighbourhoods’ (ACORN) developed by the survey company
CACI. The classiﬁcation is constructed using a combination of area-based
socio-economic data from the Census and CACI’s own consumer- and life-
style-based databases on household characteristics such as income, savings,
occupation, education, family structure and housing type. At the time of the
survey in 2011 – the classiﬁcation has subsequently been developed further –
ACORN grouped the UK population into ﬁve categories, 17 groups and 56
types. The ﬁve categories and 17 groups are summarised in Table 2. As the table
shows, ACORN is a hierarchical classiﬁcation in terms of relative wealth,
stretching from so-called ‘wealthy achiever’ to ‘hard-pressed’ households. A
neighbourhood classiﬁcation, ACORN also underlines the geography that this
hierarchy adopts, in the shape of social-spatial concentration at the neighbour-
hood level. The 10 ACORN groups highlighted in the table were selected for the
survey as reasonable cross-sections of the range of household types in the two
locations. The 10 groups accounted approximately for 76 and 84%, respectively,
of the populations, of the Bristol and Liverpool travel-to-work areas. Table 3
shows the distribution of these 10 ACORN groups across the two localities, with
Bristol having a higher share of households in Afﬂuent Greys, Flourishing
Families and Educated Urbanites groups, and Liverpool a higher share of
households in Burdened Singles and Struggling Families groups. Liverpool
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Table 2. The ACORN classiﬁcation of residential neighbourhoods
ACORN
categories ACORN groups General description of group characteristics
‘Wealthy
achievers’
A ‘Wealthy
executives’
Some of the most afﬂuent people in the UK. Live in wealthy
high-status suburban and semi-rural and rural areas.
B ‘Afﬂuent greys’ Older ‘empty nesters’ and retired couples; owner occupiers
with high percentage also owning home outright.
C ‘Flourishing
families’
Wealthy families with mortgages living in suburbs and
commuter towns.
‘Urban
prosperity’
D ‘Prosperous
professionals’
Most prosperous people living in main cities. Very well
educated and tend to be employed in managerial and
professional occupations.
E ‘Educated
urbanities’
Young, highly qualiﬁed, people. Many living in ﬂats in cities,
and most with professional or managerial jobs.
F ‘Aspiring
singles’
Young and live in urban or suburban locations, frequently
around London. Large numbers of students and well-
qualiﬁed young people.
‘Comfortably
off’
G ‘Starting out’ Younger adults starting out on their careers (many in 20s and
early 30s), including newly graduated students, young
singles in ﬁrst job and young families with children under 5.
H ‘Secure
families’
Home owning families living in suburban and semi-rural
locations, including those with young children, teenagers
and young adults not yet left home.
I ‘Settled
suburbia’
Established communities made up of empty nesters and retired
older couples. Many own their homes outright.
J ‘Prudent
pensioners’
Comfortably off retired people. Include many over 75 and the
younger retired.
‘Moderate
means’
K ‘Asian
communities’
Poor urban areas where poorly paid young people and a
relatively high concentration of Asian families are key
characteristics. Tend to be terraced streets in major cities,
including Birmingham, Bradford and London.
L ‘Post-industrial
families’
The traditional blue collar families of 20 years ago. Now made
up of people in ofﬁce or clerical jobs and shop workers.
Most are traditional families with school aged children
living in terraced housing at the cheaper end of housing
market. Most are owner occupiers, but group also includes
social renters.
M ‘Blue collar
roots’
Communities where employment is in traditional blue collar
occupations. Predominated by families and retired people,
with some young people and single parents.
‘Hard-
pressed’
N ‘Struggling
families’
Low income families living in traditional low rise estates. Most
living in socially rented accommodation, while some have
bought.
O ‘Burdened
singles’
High numbers of single adults, including single pensioners,
young singles and lone parents, living in socially rented
accommodation. Household income is low.
P ‘High-rise
hardship’
These communities have very high numbers of older residents.
There are very few traditional families and middle-aged
people. Fewer children in this group overall.
Q ‘Inner city
adversity’
Densely populated urban areas with a young multi-ethnic
population, primarily in and around London.
Source: Taken from CACI (2010)
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also stands out for having a higher than national share of households in the
Secure Families and Blue Collar Roots groups.
A disproportionate sampling approach was adopted to allow statistically sig-
niﬁcant comparison between these 10 household types as a whole across the two
city regions. In the sampling, it deliberately used the household ACORN types
that together form the overall ACORN groups rather than the standard postcode
classiﬁcation to minimise the chance of including households in the survey that
did not match the aggregate classiﬁcation.
Around 100 households were interviewed in each of the groups, split evenly
between the two city regions with sampling points located in and close to the
core city-centres. While the approach did allow comparison between the 10 types
across the two cities, the relatively small sample size of each type in each city did
mean that statistically signiﬁcant comparisons between the types within each city
were not possible. The survey was conducted between September and December
2011. In terms of annual incomes, households on the lowest annual incomes
(below £5,000) were signiﬁcantly more likely than the average to come from two
ACORN groups: Burdened Singles and Struggling Families. By contrast, three
ACORN groups had signiﬁcantly more households than the average at the higher
end of the income scale (between £55,000 and £99,000): Flourishing Families,
Educated Urbanites and Starting Outs.
Differentiated impact of recession on households: risk and resilience
The majority of households surveyed across the two case study locations
expressed the view that the recession had impacted on the way they lived,
with 83.5% of respondents in Bristol and 85.2% in Liverpool acknowledging
impact, with 43.9% of respondents in Liverpool and 41.7% in Bristol stating
it had had a ‘very/fairly big’ impact. Figure 3 reveals the impact of the
Table 3. The population share of the survey (ACORN) household groups in Bristol and Liverpool
TTWAs
% of population
Category Group Bristol TTWA Liverpool TTWA UK
Wealthy achievers Afﬂuent greys 4.7 2.6 7.9
Flourishing families 8.4 7.4 9.0
Urban prosperity Educated urbanites 4.9 1.7 5.5
Comfortably off Starting out 7.2 1.3 3.1
Secure families 16.3 19.4 15.5
Prudent pensioners 3.5 3.3 2.7
Moderate means Post-industrial families 9.9 4.5 4.7
Blue collar roots 7.5 10.6 7.5
Hard pressed Struggling families 11.3 23.6 13.3
Burdened singles 2.6 9.1 4.2
Source: Ipsos MORI (using CACI data)
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economic downturn and austerity on the different household types in this
study. It shows how existing inequalities have been widened, with those at
the lower end of the ACORN hierarchy – notably Struggling Families and
Burdened Singles – reporting greater impact than those at the upper end –
notably Prudent Pensioners and Afﬂuent Greys. A signiﬁcantly higher per-
centage of Struggling Families (26%) and Burdened Singles (22%) groups,
compared to the overall average (14.5%), felt that the economic downturn
had had a ‘very big’ impact. Fifty-six per cent of households with children
stated a ‘very/fairly big impact’, compared to 38% of those with no depen-
dants, with more females than males stating that the downturn had a ‘very/
fairly big impact’ (46% of females and 38% of males). Of the relatively
well-off households, it is notable that it was the younger ACORN groups –
the Educated Urbanites and Starting Out – that reported greater impact
(51% ‘fairly big/very big’ for the former and 47% for the latter).
Only 1% of households reported feeling no impact at all from the downturn.
The survey revealed that there was a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of house-
holds without dependants (69% compared to 44% with dependants), owner
occupiers (60% compared to 46% of social tenants) and males (61% compared
to 53% of females) who stated that the downturn had a ‘fairly small/no impact’
on their household.
Perceived changes in household ﬁnances
One of the key impacts for households was perceived to be in relation to
household ﬁnances. Respondents were asked if compared to 3 years ago
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Figure 3. Impact of crisis on how household live, by the ACORN group (% response, ranked by
‘very big impact’)
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(2008) they thought their households’ ﬁnancial situation had improved, stayed
the same or got worse. Over half of the households surveyed believed their
ﬁnancial situation had deteriorated since 2008, whilst a third stated they had
remained the same, with a tenth of households stating that their ﬁnances had
improved.
Households with dependants were most likely to have negative perceptions of
changes in household ﬁnances (61% compared to 51% of those without depen-
dants) with Figure 4 demonstrating that both Flourishing Families and
Struggling Families groups were most likely to express the view that things
had got worse, followed by households in the Secure Families and Blue Collar
Roots groups. However, households in the Struggling Families group, along with
Burdened Singles were most likely to perceive that they had enough just to meet
basic expenses (40 and 47%, respectively), whilst households in the Flourishing
Families group were most likely to perceive that they had enough to meet basic
expenses with a little left over for extras (41%), compared to 28% of Struggling
Families and 32% of Burdened Singles groups (Figure 5). Crucially, half of all
households in the Struggling Families group in the survey reported household
income of less than £20,000 per year and limited or no assets. Households in this
group were most likely to be social tenants (46%), and report having no savings.
This compares to the Flourishing Families group which had more households
than average with substantial assets and resources and were established home-
owners, with savings and at the higher end of the income scale (£55–99,000).
Again, the pattern is one of widening inequalities across the household hierarchy.
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Interestingly, households in the Prudent Pensioners group were least likely
to express the view that things had got worse and most likely to say that they
had enough to live on comfortably. This ﬁnding corresponds with ONS
(2013) and Cribb, Hood, and Joyce (2015) data indicating that retired house-
holds had experienced rising incomes throughout this turbulent period (2008–
2014). It may also be that whilst house prices and investments have been
unstable during this period, this group is most likely to include households
that have accumulated equity and savings, as well as those eligible for
universal beneﬁts (state pension, subsidised travel, winter fuel payments)
that have remained largely intact.
Perceived changes to jobs over the last 3 years
Respondents were asked to comment on what had happened to jobs over the past
three years (2008–2011) (Figure 6). Not all had been adversely affected. Thirty
per cent of households reported a pay rise and 16% had secured a better job or
been promoted – a situation more likely to be experienced by households at the
upper end of the ACORN hierarchy and notably Educated Urbanites. One third
of respondents in this ACORN group had had a pay rise and 32% had secured a
better job or been promoted, in the latter case twice the overall average. In
contrast, a range of negative experiences were reported including being made
redundant (8%), being unemployed for 6 weeks or more (10%), taking a pay cut
(11%), having to work long hours/work overtime (19%) and taking on an
additional job to meet living costs (7%). This increased labour market precarity
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was not conﬁned to groups in the lower end of the ACORN hierarchy but was
extended to some in the middle range: with 8% of respondents in the Blue Collar
Roots group having been asked to work part-time rather than full-time (over
twice the overall survey average) and 7% of the Secure Families group (7%)
having been asked to reduce their working hours signiﬁcantly (over three times
higher than the overall survey average).
Household responses to the economic downturn
Households were asked how they had responded to the recession and speciﬁcally
whether they had taken any of the actions listed in Figure 7. The survey
responses indicated that a wide range of actions, or what Watson (2010) referred
to as ‘self-governing acts of restraint’ in the context of continuing uncertainty
and uneasiness about the future, had been taken and strategies adopted by
households. As demonstrated in Figure 7, spending less and being more careful
about their spending was the most common response (50%), followed by chan-
ging shopping habits (40%), through for example shopping in cheaper super-
markets, or shopping more locally. All ACORN groups reported signiﬁcant cut
backs in spending, ranging from 41% of already Struggling Families to 58% of
Starting Out households. Other actions taken by households included cutting
back on luxury items (39%) and eating out (32%); cutting back on utilities (30%)
and buying more on credit (30%). Many households also stated that they were
saving less (36%) and a quarter of households stated they had cut back on
everything.
The survey showed that there was no signiﬁcant difference across the cities
regarding those who responded that they had cut back on everything.
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Figure 6. What has happened to job over past 3 years Bristol and Liverpool (% response)
Note: Respondents could select more than one answer
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However, 30% of females compared to 19% of males made this response, and
there was signiﬁcantly higher than average prevalence amongst households in
the Struggling Families (34%) and Burdened Singles (38%) groups and lower
amongst Flourishing Families and Educated Urbanites (17% and 18%,
respectively). A signiﬁcantly higher proportion of households with depen-
dants (34%) stated they had cut back on everything compared to 22% of
households without dependants. Social tenants were also more likely to state
this, at 40%, compared to 20% of owner occupiers and 27% of private
tenants.
Households without dependants were more likely to state ‘none of these’
with regard to activities taken in response to the crisis, with 10% of this
cohort saying this, compared to 3% of households with dependants.
Households with dependants were signiﬁcantly more likely than households
without dependants to have spent less and been more careful about their
spending across a range of activities as demonstrated in Figure 8.
Households with dependants were also far more likely to have borrowed
money from a family member/friend to help pay their bills (34%), compared
to 15% of households without dependants, as were females (24%) compared
to males (15%) (Figure 8).
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The survey ﬁndings reveal that the perceived impact of the crisis and
austerity has affected the everyday lives of most households across the
ACORN groups. Whilst both the Prudent Pensioner and Afﬂuent Greys
groups perceived the least impact, according to the survey results
Struggling Families, Burdened Singles, Post-industrial Families, and Blue-
collar Roots groups had perceived the greatest impact on their behaviour in
everyday life. In addition, these middle and lower income households gen-
erally reported only limited or no assets, such as owner occupation, savings
and private pensions, and highlighted the important role of social capital and
informal networks in enabling households to protect themselves against per-
ceived risks, respond to sudden shocks and impacts, and increasing the
options open to them, at least in the short term.
Conclusion
The picture that is emerging of the impact of the recession and unfolding
austerity programme on local government and households is of a ‘great risk
shift’ (Hacker 2008) and a more precarious future for places and people.
The uneven development trajectories, and the institutional, sectoral and
social proﬁle of Bristol and Liverpool have shaped the ways in which the
dynamics of crisis and austerity have crystallised in and impact on places. In
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Figure 8. Household responses to economic downturn – households with and without dependents
compared
Recession, Austerity and the ‘Great Risk Shift’ 639
the 2008–2009 recession, the incomes of poorer households and those
with child dependants were largely protected, and inequality actually
decreased. However, within both cities, it is increasingly the more disad-
vantaged households, particularly those with dependent children, who are
feeling the greatest effects of austerity and retrenchment in welfare beneﬁts
and public services and are seeing the biggest impact in their everyday
lives.
As risk and responsibility are devolved to the local and household level,
the role of individual and household resources, and assets (established owner
occupation, savings, private pensions), as well as social capital and informal
networks, becomes increasingly important, indeed essential in terms of resi-
lience and the ability to recover from sudden shocks. As many households are
likely to face a more precarious future and eroded household resources and
resilience, it is increasingly cities, local administrations and partnerships that
will have a crucial role in shaping, generating and innovating local economic
and social policies. But, the context in which they operate in post-crisis
austerity is increasingly challenging and geographically uneven. Local autho-
rities are facing greater pressure and demands on their services at a time when
central government support is being scaled back. It is precisely the more
disadvantaged local authorities with greater concentrations of households in
need and levels of deprivation that are being disproportionately affected by
reductions in government expenditure (see also Hastings, Bailey, and Watkins
2012; Meegan et al. 2014). Moreover, third sector agencies that provide
support for hard-pressed households in more disadvantaged local authorities
are also facing signiﬁcant ﬁnancial reductions given their greater dependence
on statutory funding (Clifford, Geyne-Rahme, and Mohan 2013; Jones et al.,
forthcoming).
Most local authorities have, so far, been able to manage austerity primar-
ily through applying efﬁciency savings, which have been accompanied by
some retrenchment of services and investment strategies (Audit Commission
2013; Hastings et al. 2013; LGA 2014). However, the picture for 2015/2016
and beyond is far more uncertain. With the Treasury announcing the con-
tinuation of the reductions seen in the 2010 Spending Review up until 2017/
2018, pressures on the local government sector are set to increase. Both
LGA (2014) and Hastings et al. (2013) noted that from 2015/2016 onwards,
tackling austerity primarily through efﬁciency savings will become increas-
ingly difﬁcult, leaving the retrenchment of council services as the primary
method for meeting budget deﬁcits.
Just at a time when many households, particularly those on low and
middle-incomes, are struggling or just getting by local authorities themselves
will become increasingly pressurised to further reduce the services they are
able to offer residents at a time when their statutory duties have remained the
same, or indeed increased.
At the national level, the social and spatial unevenness of the processes
contributing to the devolution and recalibration of risk to localities and
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households, as well as the growing income and labour market inequalities
needs to be understood and addressed. Sustainable, inclusive and progres-
sive localism and ‘re-balancing’ the economy requires a nationally coherent
urban policy that forefronts social as well as economic concerns. With the
gathering momentum for the greater devolution of powers to the local
government, there needs to be political assurances that this does not simply
involve the devolution of risk, but that the shift involves genuine local
empowerment and radical rethinking of the role of the local government in
a modern state (Murray 2014; Newman 2014). In the context of a more
inclusive and integrated urban governance, the local government will be
empowered to recognise and shape responses to needs, promote social
justice and facilitate the strengthening of resources and resilience for differ-
ent kinds of households and places.
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